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Abstract 
This empirical paper was aimed at exploring and analyzing the earnings management practices which is often refers to as “Figure 
Massaging”. The aim of this study is to gather further evidences as to whether these practices constituted an act of misconduct or 
fraud while taking into consideration the modern business environment’s challenges. The analysis provided us with an 
appropriate evidence that on average, the listed alleged fraud firms in Malaysia had aggressively managed their reported earnings 
prior to the alleged fraud year and continue to smoothen their earnings subsequent to alleged fraud year through both accruals 
and real earnings management.  
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 1. Introduction 
Contemporarily, earnings management practices that may include profit smoothing, systematic allocations, 
discretionary provisions and creative accounting are often referred to as “Figure Massaging”. While some of these 
practices are within the provisions of General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other regulatory 
documents which makes them acceptable others were purely intended for financial manipulation purposes and are 
therefore fraudulent and unacceptable. Until it can be professionally proven that figure massaging was intended for 
fraudulent purpose, earnings management are generally accepted practices in many firms all over the world and 
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Malaysia is not an exception. In fact, in today’s business reporting circle it is almost impossible to find a firm 
anywhere that does not practice figure massaging either in order to reflect or project good financial performance and 
or for the purpose of sustaining and boosting the confidence of their stakeholders in order to achieve certain 
corporate goal. 
In Asian business society, any form of dishonesty is vehemently rejected and is considered an act of fraud. So, 
any form of corporate fraud is a serious threat to business and the price is very costly not only to the firm but also to 
its individual directors. Financial statement fraud can jeopardize the credibility of not only the company, but the 
entire accounting profession and ultimately cultivate less reliance culture towards the accountants’ periodical report 
on the firm’s performance. However, in reality, not all earnings management practices are aimed at manipulating the 
financial statement of the firm or constitute an act of fraudulent financial reporting because there are basically two 
types of earnings management practices namely; accrual earnings management and real earnings management while 
one is ethically acceptable, the other is ethically discouraged or rejected.   
The main objective of this research paper is therefore, to explore figure massaging practices in Malaysian firms 
that were alleged to have committed financial reporting fraud and to examine the relationship between real earnings 
and accrual earnings management practices in these firms. The paper will also shade some light in examining the 
tendency of defrauded firms opting for real earnings management prior or subsequent to the issuance of fraudulent 
financial reporting instead of solely accruals earnings management by providing evidence on the relationship 
between these two methods of earnings management, accruals and real earnings management. This paper will 
comprehends on the types of earnings management practices among firms in Malaysia and the potential ways to 
improve auditors' and regulators' ability to detect frauds especially in maturing capital markets like that of Malaysia. 
Improved fraud detection can help the defrauded organizations and their employees, shareholders and creditors to 
curb costs associated with fraud, and can as well help regulators like the securities commissions to improve capital 
market efficiency. We believed our findings in this research will be of great interest to auditors particularly when 
providing assurance or forming an opinion on whether financial statements are free of material misstatements 
caused by fraud, especially during client selection and continuation judgments, and audit planning. Furthermore 
evidences gathered as result of analysis in this piece of work will be able to help business analyst and potential 
investors to have a better understanding of earnings management behaviours in firms that were alleged to have 
committed financial reporting frauds. 
The following sections are organized as follows: Section 2 covers the literature review and hypotheses 
development; Section 3 elaborates on the research design for this study; Section 4 provides the results and findings; 
and finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion and the recommendation for future research. 
 
1. Literature Review  
Although we could not find a study on figure massaging practices in Malaysian firms that were alleged to have 
committed financial statement fraud, we tried to explore as much literature as we could on the real earnings 
management and accrual earnings management practices. As a start, Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings 
management as the use of managers’ judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or 
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. Magrath and Weld (2002) describe 
that earnings management practices is designed either to assist managers in fulfilling their obligations to 
stakeholders or to deceive investors. Whatever the motives are, intentionally or unintentionally, earnings 
management to one extent provides deceiving reports to users. Firms who intentionally produced deceiving reports 
with regards to their earnings or delay in producing the current report to reflect their current earnings lead users of 
financial statement to make wrong decision. Fraudulent firms are those who managed earnings previously (Perols 
and Lougee, 2011). Those firms who prepare misleading financial statement will be accused as committing financial 
statement fraud. Similar to those firms who delay in submitting their reports on timely basis as violating the 
continuing listing obligations under chapter 8 of Listing Requirement of  Bursa Malaysia, 2012. Most fraudulent 
firms used accounting earnings management to manage their earnings. Matsuura (2008) divides earnings 
management into accruals earnings management and real earnings management. In this paper we tried to investigate 
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and analyze both accruals earnings management and real earnings management practices in some selected firms in 
Malaysia in prior and post fraud allegations period. 
Accruals earnings management is discretionary portion of accruals. Accounting fundamentals used to separate 
accruals into non-discretionary (normal) and discretionary (abnormal) accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are those 
accruals which are derived from normal firms’ business activities or past accounting transactions that are recorded in 
the books but have yet to be realized. Some mandatory expenses or assets are also classified under this category. 
Examples of non-discretionary accruals are payroll taxes payable, any upcoming bills and obligatory expenses that 
have yet to be realized but already recorded in the firms’ accounting records. They are not usually exposed to 
earnings management techniques. However, if the accruals have apparent deviation from the implied benchmark 
level of firms’ business activities and past accounting transactions, they are called as discretionary accruals, not 
observable and abnormal. In other words, they appear to be no business reason for these accruals and are due to 
management's choices alone. These portions of discretionary accruals are obviously employed as an instrument for 
managers or manipulators to manage earnings aggressively (Beneish, 1998). How aggressive is ‘aggressive’ 
depends on the ultimate decision to commit fraud. This is mainly because firms that manage earnings must later 
either deal with the consequences of the accruals reversals or commit fraud to offset the reversals (Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney, 1996; Beneish, 1997, 1999; Lee, Ingram and Howard, 1999). Accruals based earnings management 
are manipulated with no direct cash effect for example under accruing of expense such as bad debt, delaying an asset 
write-down, or recognising revenue prematurely (Bartov and Cohen, 2009). 
Real earnings management on the other hand, is a proxy variable for discretionary cash flow. Similar to 
discretionary accruals, discretionary cash flow from operations derived from the variance between actual cash flow 
and normal cash flow.  The normal cash flow model is developed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Normal cash flow from operations has a linear function with sales. This 
would mean, increase in sales result into increase in normal cash flow from operations. However, discretionary cash 
flow from operations has inverse relationship with sales. It means, the increase in sales in current year resulted in 
negative discretionary cash flow mainly due to lower cash flow from operations relative to sales. For example, 
lenient credit term successfully increased sales volume in current year, increasing earnings but failed to bring same 
proportion of expected cash inflow during the period. Roychowdhury (2006) defines real earnings management as 
departures from normal operational practices with the primary objective of meeting short-term earnings goals. This 
is motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain short-term financial 
reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. Managing earnings upwards are in favour to those 
managers who allure to respond to incentive-based compensation. Managing earnings upwards are likely to have 
low abnormal cash flow from operation ‘(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Whilst, other researchers find evidences that 
managers manage earnings downwards to avoid regulatory scrutiny. 
As mentioned earlier, corporate fraud is costly. Albrecht and Searcy (2011) analyzed that more than 50 percent of 
U.S. corporations in 2000 were victims of fraud, with a loss of more than $500,000 on average for each company. It 
is understood that corporate fraud cannot be scientifically observed or measured in an accurate manner. The direct 
economic losses suffered by fraud firms are only the possible costs derived from estimated cost at best. It is 
impossible to determine the actual total costs because not all fraud is detected, not all detected fraud is reported and 
not all reported fraud is legally pursued (Kranacher, Riley and Wells, 2011). KPMG Malaysia Fraud Survey 2009 
defines fraud as a deliberate deceit planned and executed with the intent to deprive another of property or rights 
directly or indirectly, regardless of whether the perpetrator benefits for his/her actions. Consistent with Coenen 
(2011), this survey also reveals that financial statement fraud, even though it represents only 10% of all fraud 
schemes but attaining the most costly fraud among all of the fraud schemes. ACFE Report (2010) classified 
financial statement fraud under occupational fraud with two others that are assets misappropriation (for example 
cash skimming and larceny) and corruption (for example bribery, kickbacks and sales schemes).  Statement of 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No.99, issued by Auditing Standard Board (ASB) of the AICPA in November 2002 
defines fraudulent financial reporting as: “intentional misstatements or omission of amounts of disclosures in the 
financial statements designed to deceive financial statement users”.   
Based on the above, financial statement fraud may be perceived as a violation of any accounting and auditing 
standards, laws and regulations enforced by any relevant reporting bodies in Malaysia, on certain facts or figures, 
32   Saliza Sulaiman et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  29 – 39 
intentionally committed the wrong doings in that particular period with the purpose to deceive the users of the 
financial statements. Many of today’s largest corporate frauds are committed by intelligent, experienced, creative 
people with a solid grasp of firms’ controls and vulnerabilities. They are generally the upper management. Most of 
them have full access to influence or manipulate firms’ financial statements. Their motivations are possibly aiming 
to manipulate earnings at its maximum bound, purposely alluring for increased performance incentives such as 
bonuses, valuable stock options up to lucrative job promotions. And many studies suggest that fraud is more likely 
to occur when someone has an incentive (pressure) to commit fraud, weakness or absence of oversight providing 
opportunity to them and later rationalization of their fraudulent behaviour. Based on KPMG Singapore Fraud Survey 
2011, 90% respondents agree that pressure to achieve certain targets as a factor that lead to fraudulent financial 
report, while 56% seeing this incentive as a significant concern. 
Fraud triangle theory consists of three fraud factors namely; pressure, opportunity and rationalization (Skousen , 
Smith and Wright, 2009; Lou and Wang, 2009 and Ravisankar, Ravi, Rou and Bose 2011). This theory explains the 
circumstances that lead to occurrence of fraud. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) confirm that this framework has been 
formally adopted by the auditing profession as part of SAS No.99. In addition to addressing incentive, opportunity 
and rationalization, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) consider the fourth pronged to the existing fraud triangle 
framework that is capability, arise to a fraud diamond theory. This pronged is consistent with the global recent 
accounting spate involving multibillion-dollar ones, whereby they would not have occurred without the right person 
with the right capabilities in place. Common methods of fraudulent financial statement manipulation include 
recording fictitious revenues, concealing liabilities or expenses and artificially inflating reported assets (ACFE 
Report, 2010). According to Kranacher et al. (2011), when a strong earnings showing is needed, there can be 
tremendous temptation to classify expenses as assets and liabilities as equity.  
 
2. Methodology 
We identified the 119 alleged firms and the charges levied against each one of them from the websites of Bursa 
Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) and Securities Commission, Malaysia and for the purpose of this study, we 
subsequently filtered and remove these firms with established financial crime, specialized and unique regulations as 
well as different accrual behaviours like banks, unit trust companies and closed-ended funds. We were left with 49 
firms from 4 different sectors of the economy (Industrial Products - 20, Consumer Products - 7, Trading or Services 
- 13 and Property - 9). This sample is assumed to be sufficient based on the rule of thumb proposed by many 
researchers that, a sample size larger than 30 and less than 500 is appropriate and sufficient for most research. And 
for each of these firms we managed to obtain the data through several stages and procedures for data analysis. In the 
first stage, financial data for alleged firms for both earnings management proxy variables, accruals earnings 
management and real earnings management, for the period from 2001 until 2011 were obtained from DataStream 
database and Osiris database. Since the firms are almost dead firms, many missing data are encountered. Quite a 
number of the alleged firms have missing data in the DataStream even though they are active firms. Any missing 
financial data were extracted manually from the annual reports for each study year.  
In the second stage, the financial data for the firms in the selected sectors, that comprised of industrial products, 
consumer products, trading or services and property for both earnings management proxy variables, accruals 
earnings management and real earnings management, from 2001 until 2011 were obtained from DataStream 
database and Osiris database. The purpose of obtaining this data is mainly to calculate the coefficient based on 
Kothari, Leone and Wesley (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006)’s models. Any missing financial figures are manually 
extracted from annual reports and the database of the study is developed and updated. All missing values were 
excluded and the data was made of complete information of the final samples selected for the alleged firms for 
eleven-year period from 2001 until 2011. Finally, the data collected was then tabulated in the forms of tables and 
graphs using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Data Editor. All the information obtained in all the 
stages will be synthesized accordingly in order to come out with the results that reflect the objective of this study 
and the data with regards to the components of the variables to calculate earnings management are extracted from 
Thomson DataStream, Osiris and annual reports of the respective firms. 
Measurements on the variables are as follows: 
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a) Accrual Earnings Management 
This variable is measured using Jones model as used in studies by Hasnan, Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran 
(2010) and Kothari et al. (2005). To estimate the accruals earnings management, we define total accruals (TAC) as 
the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities and excluding the current portion of 
long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets which is given as: 
TACit = [( non-cash current assetsit) – ( current liabilitiesit  less current portion of long term debt) – (Depreciation 
and amortization it)] / Total Assetsit-1                                                                         (1) 
Then, based on the Jones model estimated cross-sectionally using all firm-year observations for each industrial 
sector, the normal total accruals for each industry is calculated as follows: 
TACit  = 0 + 1 (1/TAit – 1) + 2 SALESit +  3 PPEit + 4 ROAit + i                                                                                            (2) 
Where: 
TACit  =  as defined above  
TAit – 1   =  lagged total assets 
SALESit = change in sales scaled by TAit – 1 
PPEit  = net property, plant and equipment scaled by TAit-1 
ROA it  = net income in current year divided by total assets in the current year 
 
b) Real Earnings Management 
The measurement for real earnings management as a proxy variable for discretionary cash flow from operation as 
has been proposed by Roychowdhury (2006). This variable is used to measure sales manipulation. Sales 
manipulation is defined as managers’ attempt to temporarily increase sales during the year by offering price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms. It is expected that the real management activities will lead to lower current 
period cash flow and higher production cost and simultaneously providing negative effect to the abnormal cash 
flow. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), the normal cash flow from operation is expressed as a linear function 
of sales and change in sales. To estimate this, we run the following cross-sectional regression for each industry and 
year in order to obtain industry-specific estimates of the co-efficient in the Equation as follows:   
CFO t / TA t-1  = 0+1(1/TAt - 1)+1(Salest/TAt - 1)+2(Salest/TAt-1)+t                                           (3)  
Where: 
CFO t / TA t-1 = Cash flow from operations for firm i at period t  
TA t-1    =  Assets at the end of the prior year,  
Sales t   =  Net Sales during year t,  
Sales t   =  Change in sales during year t, Sales t – Sales t-1. 
 
The coefficient estimates from Equation 3 are used to estimate the firm-specific normal cash flow from operation 
lagged of total assets (R_CFO t) for our sample firms: 
R_CFO t  = 0+1(1/TAt - 1) + 1(Sales t/TAt - 1) + 2(Sales t /TAt -1)+t                        (4) 
Abnormal cash flow from operation is actual cash flow from operations (CFO t) lagged of total assets minus the 
normal level of cash flow from operation (R_CFO t) using the coefficient from Equation 2. Based on the above 
measurement, we may now calculate real earnings management (REM) as follows: 
REM  =  CFOt/ TAt -1 - R_CFOt                                                                                                        (5) 
34   Saliza Sulaiman et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  29 – 39 
3. Results and Analysis 
You may wish to recall the objective of this paper is to provide us with sufficient appropriate evidence that will 
justify the allegations of committing financial statement fraud levied against the 49 firms in Malaysia that practices 
earnings management and to achieve this objective, we investigate their practices against accrual earnings 
management which is a proxy variable for discretionary accruals and real earnings management which is a proxy 
variable for discretionary cash flows. 
3.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 below explains the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the sample across the period of study 
commencing from 2001 to 2011 among alleged fraud firms in Malaysia. In this study, accruals earnings 
management (AEM) is the discretionary accruals which are employed as an instrument to manage earnings as used 
by Beniesh (1998).  
       Table 1. Descriptive statistics (2001 - 2011) for all variables 
Variables   
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation  n = 216 
AEM -0.504 0.45 -0.008 0.123 
REM -0.329 0.194 -0.018 0.085 
        The variables above are as follows: 
        AEM is discretional accruals estimated by Kothari et al.(2005)’s model. 
        REM is discretional cash flow from operations estimated by Roychowdhury (2006)’s model. 
 
Based on Table 1, the mean accruals earnings management value for the sample is – 0.008. This indicates that on 
overall alleged fraud firms tend to manage their earnings downward. This negative mean value or downward 
accruals earnings management is consistent with the study conducted by Matsuura (2008) with a mean value of – 
0.0041 for all consolidated listed Japanese firms and with a mean value of – 0.040 for Taiwanese listed family firms. 
The range for accruals earnings management value in Malaysian fraud firms is between – 0.504 to 0.450 which are 
considered at higher plots for upwards and downwards earnings management compared to prior studies by Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) that examines top 100 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia with the maximum number 
of accruals earnings management value between – 0.21 and 0.29 and – 0.329 and 0.34 respectively. Based on the 
descriptive analysis above, on average, listed fraud firms in Malaysia extremely manage their reported earnings 
through accruals earnings management either upwards or downwards.         
Further references to Table 1 indicate that there are two predictor variables used in this study. Real earnings 
management (REM) is the discretionary part of the cash flow from operations generated from operating activities. 
Generally, the average real earnings management value from operations for fraud firms in Malaysia is – 0.018. This 
is consistent with Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong listed firms having negative mean value for real earnings 
management, - 0.0173, - 0.0181 and - 0.0183 respectively in a study conducted by Lee and Swenson (2011).  The 
scenario differs from listed firms in Japan, which on average pushing their earnings management upwards through 
real earnings management with their positive mean value of 0.006 to compensate with the negative accruals earnings 
management (Matsuura, 2008).      
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Fig. 1. Mean for Accruals Earning Management and Real Earnings Management for Fraud Firms 
Source: Research Data Analysis 
Based on the above results, the range of real earnings management value for fraud firms in Malaysia is between – 
0.329 and 0.194. The range is consistent with listed firms in Japan with the range of – 0.3626 and 0.4071 (Matsuura, 
2008). Figure 1 above depicted the average value of accruals earnings management and real earnings management 
for fraud firms in Malaysia. These fraud firms on average manage their earnings upwards and downwards prior to 
fraud years (three years prior to fraud year) and continue managing earnings immediately subsequent to fraud year. 
The result indicates that on average the alleged fraud firms have managed their earnings way back prior to fraud 
years and continue managing their earnings subsequent to the alleged fraud year using both methods of earnings 
management, accruals and real earnings management methods. This finding corresponds with the findings in a 
similar study by Perols and Lougee (2011) in which they concluded that firms who are aggressive and persistently 
managing their earnings may find it difficult to find a way out to reverse their accruals, leading these firms with no 
choice but to commit fraud. Tables 2, 3and 4 below explains the variables behaviours and changes in mean and 
value range for three different phases that are the mean for three years prior to alleged fraud years (t-3, t-2 and t-1 
prior to t0), during the alleged fraud year (t0) and immediately subsequent to alleged fraud year (t+1). 
             Table 2. Descriptive statistics (prior to alleged fraud years 2001 - 2003) 
n = 132 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Pre_AEM -0.18 0.112 -0.01 0.065 
Pre_REM -0.158 0.099 -0.011 0.057 
 
Referring to Table 2 (Across three years prior to fraud year, t-3 until t-1) the mean value for accruals earnings 
management (Pre_AEM) prior to fraud year is negative – 0.010 consistent with mean value of real earnings 
management (Pre_REM) that is – 0.011. This indicates that fraud firms manage earnings downwards through both, 
increasing discretionary accruals (accruals earnings management) and discretionary cash flow (real earnings 





t-3 t-2 t-1 t0 t+1 
Relative to First Alleged Fraud Year 
Figure 1:  
 Mean for Accruals Earnings Management and Real 
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         Table 3. Descriptive statistics (during the alleged fraud years 2001 - 2010) 
n = 42 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AEMt -0.35 0.45 -0.016 0.137 
REMt -0.233 0.097 -0.029 0.083 
 
Table 3 refers to accruals earnings management and real earnings management behaviour within the fraud year 
itself. The mean value for accruals earnings management (AEMt) is – 0.016 which is higher compared to prior to 
fraud year. These firms simultaneously manage their earnings via real earnings management (REMt) activities with 
mean value increased to – 0.029 in fraud year. Obviously, firms increased their earnings management activities prior 
to commit fraud (Perols and Lougee, 2011). 
                 Table 4. Descriptive statistics (post alleged fraud years 2010 - 2011) 
n = 42 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AEMt+1 -0.388 0.351 0.010 0.140 
REMt+1 -0.277 0.146 -0.031 0.077 
 
As illustrated in Table 4, the smoothening period can be seen in post fraud year, indicating positive mean of 
0.010 for accruals earnings management (AEMt+1), while these fraud firms continue managing earnings 
operationally (real earnings management) (REMt+1) with mean value of – 0.031. Based on Table 3 and 4, the 
extreme accruals earning management activities can be seen obviously in both period, referring to the minimum and 
maximum value of accruals and real earnings management in fraud year and subsequent to fraud year with accruals 
earnings management value between –0.350 and 0.450 and  -0.388 and 0.351 respectively. This is consistent with 
real earnings management behaviour which indicates higher value in fraud year and subsequent to fraud year. The 
value ranges between – 0.233 and 0.099, – 0.233 and 0.099 in fraud and subsequent to fraud year respectively. By 
having both extreme minimum and maximum bound of accruals and real earnings management indicates that fraud 
firms in Malaysia aggressively manage their earnings prior to commit fraud. Aggressive earnings management lead 
to the likelihood of managers resort to commit fraud to achieve objectives that previously accomplished by 
managing earnings (Perols and Lougee, 2011). Fraud firms are entrenched managing earnings even subsequent to 
fraud year possibly due to lack of strict supervision and enforcement from regulators. 
4.2 T-test 
One sample t-test is used to test the mean of the population from which a sample is drawn is equal to the 
comparison standard (Sekaran dan Bougie, 2009). The sample has been drawn from a population of given mean and 
unknown variance. It is expected that one sample t-test compares the mean score of a sample to a known value. In 
this test, accruals earnings management and real earnings management are measured by their magnitude instead of 
its directional earnings behaviour.  
Referring to Table 5, based on absolute value of accruals earnings management, the mean for accruals earnings 
management is 0.086. The absolute values for accruals earnings management range between 0.001 and 0.504. Based 
on the one sample t-test, the t-statistic (14.421) for accruals earnings management is larger than the Biometrika table 
value (1.645). The result indicates that accruals earnings management is very significant at 1 percent level with a 
value of 0.000. Based on one sample t-test, the study shows that there is a significant accruals earnings management 
practices among fraud firms in Malaysia. 
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        Table 5. Univariate T-test 
n = 216 Min Max Mean 
AEM -0.504 0.450 -0.008 
Absolute value 
AEM 0.001 0.504 0.086 
(14.421)* 
REM -0.329 0.194 -0.018 
Absolute value 
REM 0.000 0.329 0.061 
  (14.755)*     
*Significant at 0.001 level using a two-tailed test 
 
Table 5 also describes the mean of the absolute value for real earnings management that is 0.061 and the value 
range between 0.000 and 0.329. Based on the one sample t-test, the t-statistic (14.755) for real earnings management 
is larger than the Biometrika table value (1.645). The result indicates real earnings management is very significant at 
1 percent level with a value of 0.000 and it occurs among fraud firms in Malaysia. 
4. Conclusion 
The descriptive analysis in this study provided us with an appropriate evidence that on average, the listed alleged 
fraud firms in Malaysia had aggressively managed their reported earnings either upwards or downwards prior to the 
alleged fraud year and continue to smoothen their earnings subsequent to alleged fraud year (t0) through both 
accruals and real earnings management. The one sample t-test further confirms the allegations that there is a 
significant accruals and real earnings management practices among fraud firms in Malaysia.  
A possible explanation for figure massaging practices is due to agency conflict and fraud diamond theory. One of 
the reasons for agency conflict is obvious, mainly due to pressure. The pressure could be from managing the 
company to meet the earnings target set by the board or company or pressure coming from the agents’ own interest 
to achieve personal incentive. Fraud diamond theory on the other hand explains this situation. Capability of that 
person making choice of earnings management pattern creates the choice of managing the earnings through accruals 
or real earnings management. Most managers while preserving aggressive accruals earnings management practices 
in finding their ways out to reverse the accruals, commit fraud and simultaneously opt for managing earnings 
operationally. Managing earnings by increasing the accruals will reduce earnings (managing earnings downwards, 
accruals earnings management increased) and reversal will increase the earnings (managing earnings upwards, 
accruals earnings management decreased). Simultaneously, firms may opt for real earnings management. 
Operationally, when we have abnormal cash flow as negative, meaning that we managed earnings upwards, for 
example by increasing sales through excessive discounts or lenient credit terms, sales figures will increased thereby 
increasing gross earnings but the cash flow from operation will be negative (discretionary cash flow negative, real 
earnings management decreased).  
In conclusion, this study views figure massaging practices (both accruals and real earnings management) as an 
incentive for managers to manage their earnings outside the GAAP, which will inevitably lead to fraudulent 
financial reporting and these alleged Malaysian firms that practices figure massaging had aggressively managed 
their earnings prior to committing the alleged fraud and continue managing their earnings, even though the 
proportion differs between accruals earnings management and real earnings management in the alleged fraud year 
and the years after. Fraud is a never-ending tragedy in the business world. Lack of regulators’ enforcement on 
imposing high penalty for such activities providing incentives for fraud firms continue their earnings management 
activities even they have committed fraud. 
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Finally, based on the above results and our analysis of the findings, we therefore conclude that although the 
initial intention of figure massaging practices were not to commit fraud but the changes in the business environment, 
pressure  on managers and poor regulatory controls can make such practices fraudulent and the findings of this paper 
raise several questions for future research. One important issue is how managers choose between real earnings 
management practices versus accruals earnings management practices when they have the flexibility to engage both. 
Comparative can be made with non-alleged fraud firms to examine their earnings management pattern as compared 
to alleged fraud firms. The financial distressed element should be included in selecting non-fraud firms since 
earnings management calculation is sensitive to these scenarios. Another area for future research is the timing of real 
activities manipulation. It is expected that the intensity to occur towards the end of the year as managers are seeking 
avenues to managed earnings through safer and less costly channel.     
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